But Mulder if you are going to use the 2Trees distinction--excuse us, the 2Ts distinction--the way Siderits defines it, no sentence of the form "I am such-and-such" is ultimately true (where ‘I' means something like ‘the person uttering this sentence') since any such sentence presupposes the existence of something (me) that has "parts." This is coherent but where we detect a problem is how it gets thinking unhinged. We have to make some big leap that we really have no reason to make. Then intellectuals like Liddy who are seeking attention get ahold of the idea "no self" which is flamboyant and melodramatic and it can get one's head spinning. "Wow! I don't exist!" Then they play make-believe (in this case, make no-believe) just like in any religion. The "no self" idea is dramatic in an unsettling way and people enjoy that! They are just like you, Mulder, staying up at night figuring out how the fact you have no evidence for ETs proves there is a government plot to conceal them! It is titillating!! But for God's sake Mulder that he argues this way isn't evidence Liddy is an alien! On the contrary, it is evidence that he is human, all-too-human!! Deluded, and eager! Even Varela, Thomson and Rosch --so sensible on most issues-- succumb to "no-self" jargon. They obviously are enamored by it. consider, for instance, the title of chapter 6, "Selfless Minds," in their wonderful book The Embodied Mind. They define "ego self" as historical patterns among moment to moment emergent formations (p. 121) -- this is right in the spirit of Parfit's family of R-theories -- and yet later on we find them denying the existence of ego self. They are denying, then, that these patterns exist? No, not at all, they don’t mean to deny that these patterns exist, they were just a bit careless, caught up in the buddhist jargon. Maybe they’d just seen Liddy on tv.

By the way, if you will permit one small digression, insofar as anybody claims empirical grounding for the no-self idea (which buddhists do sometimes claim, unfortunately), they are bankrupt. No experience (or non-experience, for that matter) can reveal mere non-existence. One may verify that meditation is interesting but in no way does it, or COULD it, support a claim of non-existence of any type even if there are many exotic experiences accessible as in the recorded descriptions of a sense of bodies dissolving, no perception of body/mind, etc. Varela et. al. say people tend to focus too much on these special altered states, rather than on simple mindfulness when they discuss meditation. See, for instance, their interesting comments in footnote 23, p. 269 and footnote 20, 263 about how Ken Wilber et. al.’s Transformation of Consciousness does this. I would guess that their observation is correct and important. Zoe adds yes their observation definitely is correct: the special effects have precisely the same value as a roller coaster ride. That can be fun, Zoe’s mom says. In any case, whatever the effects in the mindstream of those encountering these special states or non-states (including even the idea that one's experience might not include thoughts of "I", "me" etc.) they cannot do much to support any claim of non-existence! Compare the classic example, "A golden mountain one mile in diameter exists somewhere in the universe." I don't believe the claim is true, of course, but my point here is that no experiences by themselves (apart from a general theory about the world) are going to validate the claim. I would have thought you'd have seen this for yourself, Mulder, since how many times have you not made the same point about ETs? The fact we've not conclusively observed one on earth by itself does not invalidate your belief that there are ETs on earth! They might be invisible! My disagreement with you about this can’t be based on what I haven’t seen, but rather its based on a wider view of things. Like it or not (and re Ets, I do not like it), this is inevitable about such matters.

So anyway, Zoe’s point here, if I’m understanding her correctly, is that claims about empirical grounding for "no self" are wholly bankrupt, and anyone who respects meditation practices should find it insulting that people claim meditation supports the no-self claims. The existence of even dense Cartesian substantial souls is at least compatible with ANY form of experience or non-experience. Maybe we are overstating it? If you think we are wrong, Mulder, please explain how any experience or non-experience could show that souls do not exist. We are not saying souls exist, needless to say (we would hope that would be needless to say, but with you one never knows, so we said it anyway, perhaps needlessly). Of course, one can formulate an ontology (the "ultimately real things") without people (or cars) in it -- but why bother? I know that lots of people in the Bureau are attached to the "no self" jargon, thanks to you and Liddy. It'd be hard for them to quit using the melodramatic language. --But they should quit! -- It's like saying California doesn't exist because one can't see it all at once.

And in any case the 2 truths idea --lets just say 2Ts since it is shorter--isn't necessary for the points you guys want to make. Some things of type x exist by virtue of conventions, habits of mind, patterns of thought, whatever. The conventions, patterns, etc. do exist resulting in the real existence of those things of type x. They do exist ("ultimately"!). Period. Full stop. We exist. People, as well as cars, baseball games, dances, state legislatures. --And yet as people etc. we depend for our existence on mind, human life, the earth, our galaxy, the realities of space/time (just as do games and governments etc.). Liddy should simply point out the dependence relations that obtain. And you all can still get quite enough melodrama in your lives since in ordinary thought and action we tend to take ourselves as people to be independent in some essential way from anything else. Not merely independent but also in control, as owners of the qualities of experience, as well as big objects like cars; and believe it or not, even owners of people like in marriage, according to Zoe. Zoe’s mother does not agree with that part. Descartes and his tradition have done an excellent job of making explicit what we tend to believe. The big mistake, then, the "delusion" (= closing one's mind around the solidity, "density," of "me") is where the interesting philosophical and practical issues lie. These issues so far have been addressed only in a surface superficial way: buddhists got distracted by the too-imprecise 2Ts idea and contemporary analytic philosophers like Parfit have been distracted by some of the thought experiments. (But we are not saying generally that thought experiments are useless, needless to say (we hope). But the fission one, for instance, just doesn’t help.) To conclude (and sorry if we’re repeating ourselves; but it’s late and we need to finish this so we can get some sleep; after all one of us is dying and 2o3I5eu, oops, we’re all a bit tired and perhaps overemotional; please keep that in mind): You can use the 2Ts jargon if you want to, but in our opinion it merely obfuscates. The situation is simply that people and cars depend on other things for existence. But to say we are "mere conceptual constructions" creates a mess, as does the postmod claptrap about people as merely socially constructed. Notice how it blurs the distinction between such things and wholly fictional objects. Whatever we may want to say about an ordinary person e.g. Madonna (the actual person, former dancer/singer and just-confirmed Attorney General), we agree there is an R-stream of physical and mental events associated with the name ‘Madonna' in which there occur first person thoughts of the form "I am such-and-such". Yes, like when she thinks "Wow. I certainly can be sexy when I want to be. Don’t you think so?" But for wholly fictional people like Epstein or Zeus or Luke Skywalker there never occur any actual thoughts of that form within any real R-stream of events. Such thoughts can be attributed to them (as in the movies), but such thoughts never actually take place. Notice that it won't do to reply, "well, Madonna exists (albeit conventionally) whereas Epstein does not even exist conventionally." For we chose this particular fictional entity to make this very point, precisely because relative to many people's "common sense" EPSTEIN DOES EXIST just as much as Madonna! It is true "conventionally" (given Siderits' definition) that he exists --after all, almost everybody believes he exists (thanks to Zoe being on the talk shows), that he is the author of various books, that he is the buddhist psychiatrist instrumental in Carson’s rehabilitation, and so on. Scarcely anybody knows that "Epstein" is merely one of Liddy’s pen names (and even we wouldn’t even know this if Flynt had not informed us). All it takes to get "conventional existence" for any x is for enough people to believe and act so that "x exists" is agreeable to "common sense." Even one who wants to say that all people are fictions (like the philosopher Hume; or Liddy in Going to Pieces) better be able to explain the difference between fictions like Madonna and fictions like Epstein or Skywalker--there is a big difference there of some sort -- and our point here is that the 2Ts approach actually obscures that distinction! So even if you want to insist people are fictions you are going to have to do better than the 2Ts stuff!!! Again, to be fair, we’re not saying that this can't be done in terms of certain definitions of the 2Ts concepts. Indeed it can be done. Here’s how.

--Ok, Erin, you're on. You go girl! Spell it out.

--Ok. Neither non-fictional Madonna nor fictional Skywalker is ultimately real. But nonetheless given Sideret's definitions, "x exists" can correspond with the facts even though x is not ultimately real, as is the case for x=Madonna --but NOT for x=Skywalker. What is the difference? The difference between Madonna and Skywalker is that "Madonna exists" corresponds with the facts whereas "Skywalker exists" does not. Even though Madonna is not ultimately real on the 2Ts view (since "Madonna exists" entails the existence of something with parts) nonetheless she is NOT MERELY FICTIONAL whereas Skywalker not only is not ultimately real, he also can be said to be MERELY FICTIONAL ("Skywalker exists" does not correspond to facts but is simply part of an epic story. I am sure that you realize that for the sake of this discussion I am assuming that Star Wars is merely fictional; I realize that is controversial within the Bureau). So we acknowledge the 2Ts scheme can make the distinction between fictional and non-fictional entities (even within the category "not ultimately real"). And notice that not-ultimately-real FICTION nonetheless may be "conventionally real" (e.g. Epstein. Like Skywalker he is merely fictional even though, unlike the case for Skywalker, it is "acceptable to common sense" to think Epstein really DOES exist) and of course there may be non-fictional entities that are NOT conventionally real (they are not fictional yet their existence is NOT acceptable to common sense e.g. as is the case if you are correct in believing Carson and Liddy have a bunch of ET buddies buried waiting in the earth's core). But --I hope -- all of this convinces you --yes! we're convinced! you did it girl! --that while it can be made coherent, the 2Ts jargon is unnecessarily confusing.-- My what a mess!

and

Madonna is real (even though dependently real) whereas Skywalker, Huck Finn, and Epstein are not real. Despite the complexity of this discussion, generally --for which we offer our most profuse apologies-- we are simply suggesting that common sense notions about truth are the ones we should use, supplemented by the distinction between appearance and reality which philosophers and ordinary people everywhere recognize. And whether x is real or not (or merely appears to be real) is completely separate from the question whether some person or group believes in their reality or enjoys imagining them for various purposes. As for people, we are real, but dependent, entities. This common sense way of thinking then opens up directly to the interesting question, are there any real INDEPENDENT entities (that is, not dependent on other things for their existence)? If not, then some of the Mahayana buddhist philosophers got it right. But their arguments suck; at least this is what Erin is saying; it is as bad as the postmodern stuff that implicitly presupposes that the mind or something mindlike is all that is real. This is a coherent view, of course, and makes for good movies like the Matrix, but there is no reason to adopt it. We dearly hope to God Liddy never starts reading them. Or if he does, we hope for your sake you’ll have quit tracking him by then. What we have been saying, in short, is we think it is wiser to grant that the speaker does exist, and can be found, indeed can be found through ordinary perception (in the present moment of course!) even if she or he is not exactly how she or he appears at first glance to be, that is, even if she or he is not dense (to borrow Zoe’s term)--wiser to do that than to stand on the buddhist Two Truths platform to say that the speaker does not exist ultimately even if she exists conventionally, or to go eliminativist. But a full discussion of these issues would take us too far afield.