Psychological criteria of personal identity and what matters in survival

(Draft)

Contents

Introduction

Thomson's reconstruction of the Psychological Criterion.

Towards a noncircular psychological criterion.

Continuity and identity of persons.

The non-branching proviso.

A no "significant" branching proviso.

Copersonality in Grice's theory

Copersonality in Lewis's theory

The squabbling family of psychological criteria about identity and about what matters in survival

Vagueness and plasticity

Parfit's two arguments that identity does not matter

Another meta-argument that identity does not matter

A conception of copersonality as asymmetric: "the asymmetry of personal identity through time"

Copersonality and the reflexive identity theory

An argument that identity does not matter based on the "reflexive identity" theory

The failure of Velleman's argument against the possibility of being a self to a future fission successor.

Two Trains: A Train and B Train

Martin re transformation and what matters

The unity reaction.

Alternative Story

Kantian challenge to Parfit "from the past"

Kantian challenge from the future