

BACK ON TRACK
Support for Presidential Trade Authority
in the House of Representatives

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Challenging conventional wisdom, which suggests that constituency interests and membership ideology guide legislative voting on trade, we argue that the relative importance of these factors fluctuates depending on party control of the presidency. Such is the case with the House of Representatives opposing fast-track trade negotiating authority in 1997 and 1998 and then supporting trade-promotion authority in 2001. The shifting political context represented by the change in partisan control of the presidency changed the salience of ideology and constituency factors among House Republicans, leading to major trade policy changes. Using logit analysis for position taking in the House on fast track, we explore the relative effects of a variety of cross pressures on trade policy preferences across time.

Keywords: fast track; trade-promotion authority; presidential-congressional relations; trade

The recent legislative history of fast-track negotiating authority presents an interesting puzzle. Fast-track authority allows presidents to submit agreements to Congress without permitting legislative members to propose complicating amendments. This authority was relatively uncontroversial for 20 years, as all presidents from 1974 to 1993 received it. However, under President Bill Clinton, fast-track authority lapsed in 1994, and the president's attempts to restore it failed on a congressional head count in November 1997 and by a vote

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of 239 to 183 in September 1998.¹ It was not until 2001 that President George W. Bush, who expressed many of the same arguments to legislators and the public that President Clinton previously had used, was granted fast-track authority by the U.S. House.² Why did a majority Republican House, whose members generally support freer trade, not extend fast-track authority to President Clinton, although providing it to President Bush, despite the fact that both presidents held similarly strong convictions in favor of its extension and House Democrats had given it to Republican presidents routinely over the past 20 years?³

Conventional wisdom suggests that constituency interests guide legislative voting on trade. For House members, constituency interests are reflected by receipts from campaign contributors (Baldwin & Magee, 2000; Engel & Jackson, 1998; Francia, 2001; Kang & Greene, 1999), the economic conditions and political strength of labor and business in the member's district (Conley, 1999; Kahane, 1996; Schiller, 1999; Wink, Livingston, & Garand, 1996),⁴ and the expected job gains or losses in the district from trade opening (Baldwin & Magee, 2000; Bardwell, 2000).⁵ However, trade voting in the House has been complicated in recent years by increased party polarization (Bond & Fleisher, 2000). As a consequence, other factors may influence House members sometimes to support trade bills opposed by significant constituencies. These factors can include the member's ideological orientation (Gartzke & Wrighton, 1998; Sussman & Daynes, 1995) or level of support for the president (Baldwin & Magee, 2000; Bardwell, 2000; Livingston & Wink, 1997; O'Halloran, 1994; Uslander, 1998).

We assess the relative importance of constituency interests and other factors such as campaign contributions, presidential support, and ideology that affect congressional position taking on fast-track negotiating authority in 1997, 1998, and 2001. We show that congruence with other research on congressional decision making (Kingdon, 1989), constituency factors, interest group support, and membership ideology explain, in part, patterns of Republican opposition to fast-track authority in 1997 and 1998. However, constituency factors and membership ideology were significantly less important for Republicans in 2001, contributing to the reversal in policy.

To explain differences in the relative importance members attach to these competing influences, we argue that party control of the presi-

dency merits more consideration. We expect partisans to pay less attention to constituency factors if a president from their party prefers the passage of a trade bill. Specifically, we hypothesize that Republicans during the Clinton administration would be more likely than Democrats to follow constituency concerns in deciding on fast track. Conversely, with Bush as president, we expect Republicans to resist constituency pressures and fall back in line with their party leadership and support fast track.

The change in Republican behavior can be explained by shifting cross pressures on trade issues. Cross pressures concern the effect of several influences including personal, political, and constituency factors on congressional voting preferences (Bond & Fleisher, 1990). In some instances, these influences may coincide, which allows House members to cast votes that satisfy everyone (Kingdon, 1989). However, many times they do not. We show that changes in the political context, as evidenced by changes in the occupant of the White House, can affect constituency influences. The fast-track experience suggests that House members operate under greater cross pressures on trade issues when their party controls the White House. During the recent era of high party polarization (Bond & Fleisher, 2000), the House majority is less likely to delegate important trade powers to a president from the opposing party, making coalition building on trade more difficult, leading to policy gridlock (Conley, 1999; Peake, 2002).

THE POLITICS OF FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY

Recent position taking in the House on two trade bills connected to the extension of fast-track negotiating authority (now referred to as trade-promotion authority) provide an opportunity to examine more closely the competing theories of congressional voting on trade. Trade voting is different from other voting because it represents the formal delegation of power from the legislature to the executive (O'Halloran, 1994). As J. Goldstein (1986, p. 164) argues, Congress's responsibility for the trade collapse that precipitated the Great Depression led legislators to approve the reduction in their "traditional and constitutionally mandated role in tariff-making" and shift institutional responsibility for trade policy to the executive. Although fast-track

authority is an example of the delegation of legislative authority to the president, it was uncontroversial for many years. After the growth in the 1980s of the U.S. trade deficit coupled with labor unions' and other groups' growing concerns over the effects of free trade with its members, the controversy surrounding the issue of free trade appeared to reach the pinnacle with the passage of NAFTA in 1993 (Francia, 2001; Engel & Jackson, 1998).

Recent research has linked the subsequent resistance in Congress to granting fast-track authority in the late 1990s to the more politicized environment on trade policy following NAFTA (Bardwell, 2000). Because of the more politicized environment and the fact that Congress delegates responsibility to the president, we therefore expect members of Congress not from the president's party to be less swayed by the president's position in favor of fast track and to be more swayed by the member's ideological orientation, constituency pressures, and interest group contributions. At the same time, the president is predicted to have greater influence over his copartisans in Congress than otherwise might be the case.

The literature identifies two explanations for policy changes in legislatures over time. First, there is turnover in legislative membership. Usually, turnover-driven policy change is gradual; however, significant turnover can have important effects on policy (Brady & Lynn, 1973; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995). Second, legislators may change their votes on key issues. Any number of personal, political, and constituency factors may influence the decision to change one's vote on a crucial piece of legislation (Brady & Sinclair, 1984). For example, members of Congress may anticipate changes in public opinion and thus alter their opinions on key issues before an election (Stimson et al., 1995).

Scholars have identified several factors that might cause a member to switch her vote on a piece of legislation from one year to the next. Shift of party control of the presidency has been identified as an important factor (Asher & Weisberg, 1978; Pritchard, 1987). Asher and Weisberg (1978) suggest that the most abrupt changes in legislative decisions are likely to be linked to changes that occur with shifts in control of the presidency.

Ultimately, there are three competing views of the factors that influence changes in congressional voting on fast track: constituency

influences, legislator ideology, and presidential influence. We model these effects and weigh their relative importance across time, accounting for the changing political context. Doing so allows us to determine whether change in trade outcomes in 2001 versus 1997 is due to conversion or membership turnover. Our contention is that the change in the outcome of the fast-track vote is primarily due to membership conversion and not turnover. As Jones (1994) argues, a change in the political context can alter the cues on which members of Congress base their votes.⁶ Because fast track represents a delegation of authority to the president by the Congress, the occupant of the White House especially structures trade preferences of members of Congress.

MODEL SPECIFICATION

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variables we use are the positions taken by House members on fast track in 1997 and trade-promotion authority in 2001. Normally, roll-call votes are the most reliable measures for assessing the trade preferences of House members. However, in the 105th Congress (1997-1998), this is not so. We use head-count data provided by Conley (1999, p. 787) instead of the 1998 roll call for two reasons. First, President Clinton did not push fast track in 1998 as strongly as in 1997. Second, in order to permit a more accurate comparison with 2001, when the context of elections was not present, we chose to use the 1997 head-count data.⁷ *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Almanac* provides data for the 2001 vote. These positions reflect variations in the dependent variable—in support of or opposition to granting the president authority to negotiate trade agreements without complicating amendments. We code a preference for fast track as 1 and opposition as 0.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES⁸

NAFTA job losses, percentage of district blue-collar workers, and district income. Opponents of fast track hold that freer trade policies harm workers in less competitive industries. Lowering tariffs for steel

and other industrial goods may cause the closure of factories, leading to worker dislocation. Opening the U.S. market to textiles and agricultural products may also negatively effect domestic employment. The district-level employment effect of NAFTA is a popular argument to explain opposition to fast-track authority (Baldwin & Magee, 2000; Bardwell, 2000). Therefore, we include NAFTA-related job loss data, which come from Bardwell (2000). The data reflect the raw number of jobs lost in the district due to NAFTA as estimated by the Department of Labor in 1998.

Many of the expected losses from freer trade are often linked to older industries not tied to the service sector. Blue-collar industrial jobs in particular are likely to be most vulnerable to competition from cheaper goods coming primarily from the developing world. Popular wisdom suggests representatives of blue-collar districts will oppose freer trade to serve constituency interests (Kang & Greene, 1999). We use Adler's (2003) congressional district data set to measure the percentage of blue-collar workers in the district.⁹ The variable is the number of blue-collar workers in the district as a percentage of the total district population.¹⁰

We also control for the effects of district wealth on trade preferences. The expectation is that representatives from poorer districts are more likely to oppose fast track. Median household income of the district data comes from Adler's congressional district data set.

Interest group influence and right-to-work state. Related to job loss and blue-collar employment is the effect of labor unions on trade policy. Union membership is usually higher in industries under threat from freer trade. An important avenue for unions to express their wishes to politicians is through political action committee (PAC) contributions. Labor's ability to provide carrots or sticks to candidates through contributions, a practice noted by Engel and Jackson (1998) and Francia (2001), may influence free-trade votes (Baldwin & Magee, 2000; Bardwell, 2000; Kang & Greene, 1999). Members receiving significant money from labor are expected to oppose fast-track authority.

Alternatively, business interests also contribute heavily to House members' campaigns, and such interests generally favor freer trade (Baldwin & Magee, 2000). Business PACs, at times, punish represen-

tatives who vote against freer trade (Jackson & Engel, 2003). Similarly, right-to-work states have laws that inhibit union goals of increasing membership and limit labor's persuasive capacity with legislators. Members from right-to-work states are more likely to favor free trade (Conley, 1999). Contribution data for labor and business PACs are obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics (<http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/index.asp>, retrieved August 27, 2003).¹¹ Data for legislators in right-to-work states are from the National Right-to-Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. (<http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm>, retrieved August 27, 2003). The variable is coded 1 for representatives from right-to-work states, 0 otherwise.

Ideology, presidential support, and electoral safety. In contrast to constituency pressures, legislator ideology (Baldwin & Magee, 2000; Conley, 1999; Gartzke & Wrighton, 1998; Kahane, 1996; Sussman & Daynes, 1995) or support for the president may prove important (Livingston & Wink, 1997; Uslander, 1998). Supporters of freer trade are often linked to a more conservative, laissez-faire economic viewpoint, whereas liberals align with a more enhanced role for the state in protecting industry (Wink et al., 1996, p. 753). We use Poole and Rosenthal's (1997; see also Poole, 2003) first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores for the Congress in which the vote occurred to measure member ideology. The measure ranges from -1 to +1 from most liberal to most conservative.

Presidents lobby heavily on trade, as evidenced by journalistic accounts of Clinton's and Bush's efforts. The nature of fast-track authority, combined with this lobbying activity, creates a clear linkage to the presidency (Uslander, 1998). Presidential support scores—the percentage of the time legislators voted with the president on roll-call votes in 1997, 1998, and 2001—are gathered from the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*.¹² These data represent the level of support each member generally gives the president.

Electoral safety also may enhance legislative autonomy from constituency pressures. If legislators are safe, the potential costs of retaliation from their reelection constituencies may be quite low (Conley, 1999; Holian, Krebs, & Walsh, 1997). Margins of victory in previous elections allow legislators the freedom to vote contrary to constituency interests periodically, when other goals may be paramount

(Fenno, 1978). We use each member's margin of victory (as a percentage of the two-party vote) in the election prior to the fast-track vote (or head count) to measure electoral safety. *The Almanac of American Politics* (Barone & Ujifusa, various years) provides electoral data.

FINDINGS

We ran several logit models to assess the determinants of House preferences on fast-track trade authority for 1997 and 2001. The 1997 results are presented in Table 1, and the 2001 results are presented in Table 2.¹³ For each case, we split the House by party, running separate models for Republicans and Democrats. We justify splitting by party because of multicollinearity issues and our expectation that we will find varying effects depending on the member's party due to the changing partisan context.¹⁴

1997 FAST TRACK

Republicans in 1997. Although Republicans are predisposed to support free trade, a large enough number abandoned the party leadership to ensure the failure of fast track in 1997. What caused this opposition within the Republican Party? As expected, constituency factors prove important in predicting Republican opposition to fast track in 1997.¹⁵ NAFTA-related job losses within the district and the percentage of blue-collar workers had clear impacts on Republicans. As those numbers increased, the probability of support decreased significantly. A Republican from a district harmed significantly by NAFTA (886 job losses as opposed to the mean of 359) was 21% less likely to support fast track. Additionally, Republicans from districts with significantly more blue-collar workers were 44% less likely to support fast track than their copartisans from an average district. The "safest" Republicans may have been insulated from these constituency effects, as they were 35% more likely to support fast track.

Constituency factors do not tell the full story for Republicans in 1997. Republicans supported by labor PACs are much more likely to oppose fast track than typical Republicans (by 39%). In addition,

TABLE 1
Logit Models of House Position Taking on
Fast-Track Trade Authority, November 1997

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Republicans</i>		<i>Democrats</i>	
Constituency factors				
Winning % 1996	0.042**	(+.35)	-0.033**	(-.36)
NAFTA job loss	-0.001**	(-.21)	0.0002	
Right-to-work state	-0.587		1.23**	(+.27)
Median income	-0.000024		-0.000008	
% blue collar	-0.31**	(-.44)	-0.199*	(-.36)
Interest groups				
Business PAC \$ (1996)	0.0000036**	(+.32)	0.0000042**	(+.26)
Labor PAC \$ (1996)	-0.00007**	(-.39)	-0.000012**	(-.42)
Presidential support (1997)	0.087**	(+.47)	0.127**	(+.49)
Ideology (105th Congress)	-3.05**	(-.36)	7.01**	(+.33)
Constant	1.93		-5.60**	
<i>n</i> (see Note 1)	187		193	
Likelihood ratio test	156.2**		130.6	
Cox & Snell R^2	.33		.25	
% modal category	70.0		81.3	
% Correctly predicted	81.8		81.4	
Proportional reduction in error	.41		.00	

NOTE: PAC = political action committee. Cell entries include coefficients. Changes in probability of voting yea are in parentheses (often referred to as *p*). For dummy variables (right-to-work state), we report the change in probability from .5 if the variable goes from 0 to 1. For interval variables, we report the change in probability from .5 if these variables change by 1 standard deviation. Because the logit curve is steepest at .5 probability, these estimates indicate the maximum potential effect of these variables. SPSS version 9.0 for Windows was used for the analysis. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, one-tailed; two-tailed tests were used for the constant.

Republicans better supported by business PACs were 32% more likely to favor the measure. Oddly, the most conservative Republicans were actually more likely to take positions *against* fast track. The most conservative wing of the Republican Party (along with the constituency-pressured Republicans noted above) abandoned the leadership on fast track. Republicans with an ideology score one standard deviation more conservative than the party's mean were 36% less likely to support fast track.

Democrats in 1997. Constituency factors are also significant in explaining patterns of Democratic support for fast track in 1997.

TABLE 2
Logit Models of House Voting on
Trade-Promotion Authority, December 2001

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	
Constituency factors			
Winning % 2000	0.0085	-0.0191*	(-.29)
NAFTA job loss	-0.0003	0.000025	
Right-to-work state	-0.151	0.955**	(+.22)
Median income	0.000026	-0.000041	
% blue collar	-0.115	-0.191*	(-.35)
Interest groups			
Business PAC \$ (2000)	0.0000003	0.0000018*	(+.12)
Labor PAC \$ (2000)	-0.000011*	(-.18)	-0.000002
Presidential support (2001)	0.0344*	(+.47)	N/A (see Note 14)
Ideology (107th Congress)	-0.0961	3.57**	(+.42)
Constant	-0.867	1.02	
<i>n</i> (see Note 1)	202	206	
Likelihood ratio test	130.43**	105.74	
Cox & Snell R^2	.10	.19	
% modal category	87.6	88.3	
% correctly predicted	88.1	91.3	
Proportional reduction in error	.04	.24	

NOTE: PAC = political action committee; NA = not applicable. Cell entries include coefficients. Changes in probability of voting yea are in parentheses (often referred to as *p*). For dummy variables (right-to-work state), we report the change in probability from .5 if the variable goes from 0 to 1. For interval variables, we report the change in probability from .5 if these variables change by 1 standard deviation. Because the logit curve is steepest at .5 probability, these estimates indicate the maximum potential effect of these variables. SPSS version 9.0 for Windows was used for the analysis.

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, one-tailed; two-tailed tests were used for the constant.

Among Democrats, the significant indicators of support for fast track are whether their state is right-to-work, the number of blue-collar workers in the district, patterns of interest group support for the House member, the member's presidential support score, and ideology. NAFTA-related job losses prove insignificant in predicting Democratic opposition to fast track in 1997, unlike with Republicans. Additionally, the "safest" Democrats were less likely to abandon labor's stand against fast track.

Among Democrats, those receiving the greatest support from business PACs (\$281,000) were 26% more likely to support fast track than those receiving the average contributions. Additionally, Democrats

receiving much larger than average support from labor PACs (\$199,000) were 42% less likely to support fast track than the average Democrat. Democrats with the highest levels of presidential support in 1997 were more likely to support Clinton on fast track. The most conservative Democrats were more likely to support fast track as well. Interestingly, ideology had the opposite effect among Democrats and Republicans, with the most conservative Republicans having a higher probability of opposition to fast track, whereas the most conservative Democrats were more likely to support it.

2001 FAST-TRACK VOTE

Republicans in 2001. Whereas constituency factors prove significant in predicting Republican opposition to fast track in 1997, we find no constituency-based influence in 2001. Although labor money was significant in increasing Republican opposition to fast track in 1997, and we see a similar but smaller (negative 18% compared with negative 39%) effect in 2001, the most important indicator of support for trade-promotion authority among Republicans was legislative support of President Bush in 2001, with a maximum relative effect of positive 47%. The absence of constituency effects on Republican voting on trade promotion in 2001 corresponds with our expectation that Republicans were cross pressured by the presence of Bush in the White House instead of Clinton. Additionally, the effects of ideology disappear among Republicans in 2001. The conservative wing of the party appears to have quelled their opposition to trade promotion with a president of their own party in office.

Democrats in 2001. Constituency factors remain important among Democrats in 2001, and they are especially significant given the absence of constituency influence among Republicans in 2001. "Safe" Democrats still appeared free to oppose trade promotion in 2001, whereas Democrats from blue-collar districts were much less likely to support the measure. Democrats from right-to-work states were 22% more likely to vote for trade promotion than other Democrats. The effect of labor PAC money on Democrats disappears in 2001 (it was highly significant in 1997), yet business PAC money

remains a significant indicator of support for trade promotion. Additionally, ideology proves a significant indicator of Democratic support for trade promotion, with the most conservative Democrats most likely to vote in favor of the bill, as was the case in 1997.

Turnover or member conversion? An important dilemma upon which this research sheds light is the puzzle of what is the root cause of a change in support for fast track—turnover or conversion? Answering this question requires a brief analysis of vote switching on fast track in Congress in 1997 and 2001. Treating the Congressional district as the unit of analysis, we examine vote change from “no” in 1997 to “yes” in 2001. In 53 districts there was a vote change from no to yes between 1997 and 2001. A cross-tabulation among districts held by Republicans in 2001 (see Table 3) shows no difference in the proportion of vote switches between districts that kept the same member from 1997 to 2001 and those that experienced turnover. This indicates that the change in outcome of the fast-track vote was not due to the influx of protrade Republican legislators.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Some important patterns emerge in our analyses of fast-track preferences in the House of Representatives in 1997 and 2001. Although most of the factors identified in the literature prove important at different times and among different members of Congress, determining what these patterns suggest about congressional behavior on trade is our primary task. In 1997, patterns of support for fast track suggest that constituency factors are very important for predicting Republican opposition to fast track. In fact, a significant number of Republicans abandoned the party’s stand on fast track in 1997, opposing the measure. The analysis suggests two explanations. First, because they were not voting to give a Republican president fast-track authority, Republicans with labor-leaning constituencies or constituencies hurt by NAFTA eschewed their party leadership and took positions against fast track. Second, the most conservative Republicans opposed fast track, which demonstrates an “unholy alliance” among conservative

TABLE 3
Vote Change, Turnover, and Conversion: Republicans Only

	<i>Same Member 1997 and 2001</i>		<i>Different Member 1997 and 2001</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>
Did not change vote from no to yes between 1997 and 2001	81.5	141	77.1	37	80.5	178
Changed vote from no to yes between 1997 and 2001	18.5	32	22.9	11	19.5	43
Totals	100.0	173	100.0	48	100.0	221

$\chi^2(1) = .468$, significance (two-tailed) = .494

Republicans and liberal Democrats that appeared during the 1990s against free trade (Shoch, 2000). This pattern among Republicans is clear in 1997. However, with Bush in the White House, it disappears in 2001.

Democrats, on the other hand, were cross pressured in 1997 on trade. Do they give a Democratic president the trade authority he desires, or do they do what their constituents and contributors want? Although Democrats primarily opposed the trade bill in 1997, a few of the president's most ardent supporters expressed support for the measure. In 2001, this cross pressure disappeared with a Republican in the White House. As a result, constituency factors (percentage blue collar) and personal factors (ideology) are most significant among Democrats when compared to Republicans in 2001 and Democrats in 1997.

In 2001, the political context changed for the GOP as well; opposition among their ranks folded with a Republican in the White House. The same constituency factors that predict Republican opposition to fast track in 1997 have no effect among Republicans in 2001. In addition, with a Republican president the effect of ideology on Republican votes disappears. The reason for this change is clear: the cross pressure created by a president of their own party demanding trade-promotion authority, which caused Republicans to put aside personal and constituency concerns. With a Republican as president, many wavering members of the GOP supported trade promotion in 2001.

The change in context apparent from the shift in control of the presidency is a plausible explanation for the patterns noted above. Republicans, traditionally loyal to their presidents (Edwards, 1989), voted overwhelmingly to grant President Bush trade-promotion authority in 2001. Many more had abandoned the party leadership in 1997, mainly due to constituency factors and ideological backlash from the most conservative wing of the party. Free from presidential loyalty concerns, Republicans were able to oppose granting greater trade authority to President Clinton. This shift in partisan political context caused a shift in the importance of constituency factors and ideology among Republicans.

The major conclusion to draw from this research is that the overall political context as shaped by the party of the occupant of the White House strongly influences congressional preferences on trade. Recent research (Bardwell, 2000; Conley, 1999) has downplayed the importance of partisanship in securing greater presidential trade authority, instead focusing on the increased importance of constituency concerns following NAFTA. These studies conclude that constituency concerns will structure future efforts of presidents to attain greater trade authority (Conley, 1999, p. 97). Our analysis, however, suggests that the effects of constituency concerns on *Republican* trade preferences are not enduring. Combined with previous research, our analysis suggests that the relative importance of constituency on House trade preferences fluctuates under varying political contexts. The White House also structures House trade preferences. With Bush as president, trade-promotion authority is back on track.

The broader implications of this study include the importance of presidential influence on copartisans, especially the president's ability to convince members of Congress to vote against constituent interests. By comparing House preferences on fast track, we add to our understanding of important policy changes in Congress. Although our research implies that a change in outcome on fast track was due to conversion rather than membership turnover, future research ought to investigate this matter by examining more trade votes over a longer period of time.

APPENDIX TABLE 1
Logit Models of House Voting on Fast-Track Trade Authority, 1998

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Republicans</i>		<i>Democrats</i>	
Constituency factors				
Winning % 1996	0.018*	(+.18)	-0.057**	(-.46)
NAFTA job loss	-0.0011**	(-.23)	0.00004	
Right-to-work state	-0.339		0.995**	(+.23)
Median income	0.000011		0.00004*	(+.35)
% blue collar	-0.205**	(-.37)	-0.029	
Interest groups				
Business PAC \$ (1998)	0.00000075		0.0000027*	(+.23)
Labor PAC \$ (1998)	-0.000032**	(-.33)	-0.000017**	(-.47)
Presidential support (1998)	-0.014		0.057**	(+.49)
Ideology (105th Congress)	-3.206**	(-.38)	4.06*	(+.22)
Constant	5.08**		-3.27	
<i>n</i> (see Note 1)	208		191	
Likelihood ratio test	203.21**		125.75**	
Cox & Snell R^2	.23		.22	
% modal category	68.8		83.2	
% correctly predicted	80.8		85.3	
Proportional reduction in error	.33		.18	

NOTE: PAC = political action committee. Cell entries include coefficients. Changes in probability of voting yea are in parentheses (often referred to as delta p). For dummy variables (right-to-work state), we report the change in probability from .5 if the variable goes from 0 to 1. For interval variables, we report the change in probability from .5 if these variables change by 1 standard deviation. Because the logit curve is steepest at .5 probability, these estimates indicate the maximum potential effect of these variables with an increase in 1 standard deviation. SPSS version 9.0 for Windows was used for the analysis.

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, one-tailed; two-tailed tests were used for the constant.

APPENDIX TABLE 2
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>All Members</i>		<i>Republicans</i>		<i>Democrats</i>	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
1997						
Winning % (1996)	29.1	19.9	25.7	16	32.8	23
NAFTA job loss	355	602	359	527	351	677
Median income	36	9.3	37	9.4	35	9.1
% blue collar	6.9	2.2	6.9	2.3	7.0	2.1
Business \$ (1996)	200	164	251	170	145	138
Labor \$ (1996)	63.9	78.1	10.9	18.7	122	77.3
Presidential support (1997)	48.6	26.2	25.6	8.4	74.4	12.1
Ideology (105th Congress)	0.067	0.462	0.479	0.154	-0.388	0.161

(continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 2 (continued)

Variable	All Members		Republicans		Democrats	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
2001						
Winning % (2000)	39.4	25	35.3	22.8	43.6	26.5
NAFTA job loss	355	602	369	535	341	665
Median income	36	9.3	37	9.2	35	9.4
% blue collar	6.9	2.2	7.0	2.3	6.9	2.1
Business PAC \$ (2000)	259	199	305	217	213	166
Labor PAC \$ (2000)	81.3	127	23.6	44.9	141	155
Presidential support (2001)	60.2	29.6	86.3	11.2	34	15.9
Ideology (107th Congress)	0.038	0.46	0.435	0.215	-0.37	0.237

NOTE: PAC = political action committee. Median income and campaign contributions are presented in this table in thousands of dollars. Actual values are used in the analysis. Right-to-work state is not included because it is coded as a dummy variable.

NOTES

1. In November 1997, 81.4% (162-37) of the Democrats expressing a position opposed the bill, whereas 68% (133-63) of Republicans supported it (Conley, 1999). In September 1998, 83.5% (167-33) of Democrats voting opposed the bill, whereas 67.9% (150-71) of Republicans supported it.

2. For instance, both President Clinton and President Bush relied on national security concerns to elicit support. President Bush implied a link between the expansion of trade and terrorism. Bush said, "The terrorists attacked the World Trade Center, and we will defeat them by expanding and encouraging world trade" ("Bush Links," 2001, p. 6). Similarly, Clinton explained, "More than ever, our economic security is also the foundation of our national security" (Broder, 1997, p. 1). Both leaders also warned that defeat of fast track would damage the international standing of the United States. Indeed, Bush stated that if Congress rejected the trade measure, "no one will negotiate [with the United States]" (Kahn, 2001, p. 22). Clinton claimed that a vote against fast track "will limit America's ability to advance our economic interests, promote our democratic ideals, our political leadership" (Mitchell, 1997, p. 1).

3. We choose to examine the House solely because in each case, the vote in the House has been closer, and in each case of failure, it was the House that rejected fast track.

4. See also K. Goldstein (1999) for a discussion of strategies used by interest groups to influence congressional members who are undecided on particular legislation.

5. For a contrasting view on interest group influence on trade legislation, see J. Goldstein (1986, p. 178).

6. See also Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold, and Zorn (1997), who suggest that legislators behave dynamically.

7. Both Conley (1999) and Bardwell (2000) used these head-count data in their analyses. We use the 1997 data instead of 1998 because of Clinton's clearer effort to gain congressional backing for fast track. We also conducted the analysis using roll-call data for 1998, with results provided in Appendix Table 1.

8. A number of independent variables in the models contain missing data, which accounts for the difference in N between positions on fast track in 1997, 1998, and 2001 and the number of votes reported in our logistic regression models. For instance, in the 105th Congress (1997-1998), six members of the House were replaced at some point during their term, causing problems with some of the variables. A number of other independent variables for the 2001 model contain a random distribution of missing data as well. Louisiana is also excluded from both models because of missing data in the winners' percentage of the two-party vote (Louisiana's run-off system prevents calculation of this variable). In 1997, a number of members also did not express a clear preference on fast track and therefore are excluded from the analyses (see Conley, 1999, p. 787). Summary statistics for the independent variables are provided in Appendix Table 2.

9. At the following Web site (accessed January 2003): <http://sobek.colorado.edu/esadler/districtdatawebsite/CongressionalDistrictDatasetwebpage.htm>

10. Box-Steffensmeier et al. (1997) use union density to measure labor's influence. We use a number of other variables to account for this key relationship. First, we use blue-collar percentage in the district to measure the importance of workers in occupations that often are threatened by extending trade. Because in some of these industries, especially those located in the South, union membership will be quite low, blue-collar percentage is a better measure of the presence of these workers. To take account of low union membership, we also include a right-to-work variable. To measure the direct influence of unions on members of Congress, we control for labor political action committee (PAC) contributions. Finally, we run our models with union density in place of blue-collar percentage and right to work, finding no important differences in the pattern of significant variables. Additional results are available from the authors on request.

11. For 1997, we use business and labor PAC totals from the 1996 election cycle. For the 1998 and 2001 vote analyses, we use 1998 and 2000 election cycle data, respectively.

12. We re-estimate the presidential support scores after excluding the vote on fast-track authority in order to produce an adjusted score. We use the adjusted score in the analysis.

13. As discussed above, we present and refer to the 1997 and 2001 results in the text due to the clearer linkage of these legislative positions to presidential efforts. Results from 1998 are provided for the reader in Appendix Table 1, and differ slightly from the 1997 analysis. Changing patterns from 1998 to 2001 actually support our hypotheses concerning the changing salience of constituency factors more readily for both Democrats and Republicans. The results for Republicans are more consistent across both 1997 and 1998.

14. Conley (1999) and Bardwell (2000) split their analyses by party for similar reasons. A collinearity matrix shows that including presidential support and ideology in the same model with all members (not split by party) is problematic, with very high (.9+) correlations between the two variables. This is less of a problem when the models are split by party, however. Multicollinearity between these two variables becomes a problem among Democrats in the 2001 analysis, so results there include only ideology in the model. We ran different variations of the models with each of the variables and find no notable differences. No other variables in the models exhibited multicollinearity problems. This problem is not surprising given the extreme ideological polarization between the two parties as noted by scholars (see Bond & Fleisher, 2000). Additionally, splitting by party makes theoretical sense in this analysis because of the expectation that the changing context of party control of the presidency will affect Republicans and Democrats differently. Finally, we ran an analysis with all members, controlling for party as a dummy variable (and excluding ideology and presidential support due to multicollinearity), and in each case the variables that we discuss as significant remain significant.

15. House Republican members are perhaps responding to the concerns of the Christian Right, an important conservative constituency that sometimes opposes freer trade.

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