Research

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I am interested in all aspects of normative philosophy.  But I publish in two (broad) areas: business ethics and moral and political philosophy.
A lot of my research deals with issues at the intersection of political philosophy and business ethics.  I think of these subjects as closely connected.  States and firms both direct the activity of, and distribute resources to, their members and others.  Thus questions about legitimate authority and distributive justice, among others, arise in both contexts.  I am particularly interested in what might be called “wage justice,” especially CEO compensation, comparable worth, and the minimum wage.  In addition, I am working on a few papers deriving from my dissertation on desert's role in theories of distributive  justice.
Below is a list of my major published papers, with links to most (in PDF).  I have posted penultimate drafts -- see the journal indicated for the final version.  For a complete list of publications and works in progress, visit my CV (in PDF).  Feel free to get in touch if you want a copy of any of my other papers.

Business Ethics

“How Much Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?” Business Ethics Quarterly, forthcoming (2009).
Debates about the ethics of executive compensation are dominated by familiar themes. Many writers consider whether the amount of pay CEOs receive is too large – relative to firm performance, foreign CEO pay, or employee pay. Many others consider whether the process by which CEOs are paid is compromised by weak or self-serving boards of directors. This paper examines the issue from a new perspective. I focus on the duties executives themselves have with respect to their own compensation. I argue that CEOs’ fiduciary duties place a moral limit on how much compensation they can seek or accept from their firms. Accepting excessive compensation leaves the beneficiaries of their duties (e.g., shareholders) worse off, and thus is inconsistent with observing those duties.

“Deserving Jobs, Deserving Wages,” Normative Theory and Business Ethics (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 119 - 146.
This chapter applies recent work on the concept of desert to issues of job justice (who ought to be hired, fired, promoted, and demoted) and wage justice (how much workers, including managers, ought to be paid).  Desert plays a minor role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice.  I ask, first, whether the objections that have led political philosophers to abandon desert should lead business ethicists to abandon it also.  I argue that they should not.  But appeals to desert in the context of business are not unproblematic.  A second theme of my discussion is that desert is a more complicated concept than is generally recognized, and so considerations of desert may support far different policies than might at first be thought. 

“Business Ethics: An Overview,” Philosophy Compass 3:5 (2008), pp. 956 - 972.
This essay provides an overview of business ethics. I describe important issues, identify some of the normative considerations animating them, and offer a roadmap of references for those wishing to learn more. I focus on issues in normative business ethics, but discuss briefly the growing body of work in descriptive business ethics. I conclude with a comment on the changing nature of the field.

“McMahon on Workplace Democracy,” Journal of Business Ethics 71:4 (2007), pp. 339 - 345.
[NB: This was written for a symposium on McMahon's book at the 2005 Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association.]  This paper offers a sympathetic critique of Christopher McMahon’s Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management.  Although I find fault with some of his arguments, my goal is not to show that these arguments are irreparable, but to highlight issues that deserve further consideration.  First, I raise an objection to McMahon’s rejection of the moral unity of management thesis.  Second, I draw attention to his “moralization” of the workplace, and examine the role it plays in his arguments about the relative strengths of the different kinds of authority.  Third, I raise questions about his reliance on an analogy between states and firms.  I suggest that states and firms are in some ways more alike, but in other ways less alike, than he allows.

“On the Relevance of Political Philosophy to Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly 15:3 (2005), pp. 453 - 471.
The central problems of political philosophy (e.g., legitimate authority, distributive justice) mirror the central problems of business ethics.  The question naturally arises: should political theories be applied to problems in business ethics?  If states should be democratically governed by their citizens, for example, does it follow that businesses should be democratically managed by their employees?  Most theorists who have considered these questions, including John Rawls in Political Liberalism, and Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis in a 1999 article, have said “no.”  They claim that states and businesses are different kinds of entities, and hence require different theories of justice.  I challenge this claim.  While businesses differ from states, the difference is one of degree, not one of kind.  Business ethics has much to learn from political philosophy.

“Do CEOs Get Paid Too Much?” Business Ethics Quarterly 15:2 (2005), pp. 257 - 281.
Reprinted in a shortened version in (1) Laura P. Hartman and Joseph R. Desjardins (eds.), Business Ethics: Decision-Making for Personal Integrity and Social Responsibility (McGraw-Hill, 2008); and in (2) Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman Bowie, and Denis Arnold (eds.), Ethical Theory and Business, 8th edition (Prentice Hall, 2008). (3) Reprinted under the title, “How to (Try to) Justify CEO Pay,” in Robert Kolb (ed.), The Ethics of Executive Compensation (Blackwell, 2006).
In 2003, CEOs of the 365 largest U.S. corporations were paid on average about $8 million, 301 times as much as factory workers.  This paper asks whether CEOs get paid too much.  Appealing to widely recognized moral values, I distinguish three views of justice in wages: the agreement view, the desert view, and the utility view.  I argue that, no matter which view is correct, CEOs get paid too much.  I conclude by offering two ways CEO pay might be reduced. 

Moral and Political Philosophy

“Rawls, Self-Respect, and the Opportunity for Meaningful Work,” Social Theory and Practice, forthcoming (2009).
In his late work, John Rawls identifies the opportunity for meaningful work as a social basis of self-respect. This constitutes a significant shift in his account of self-respect, one that has so far been overlooked. In this paper, I examine it. I begin by clarifying Rawls’s account of self-respect in A Theory of Justice, then consider some post-Theory developments in it. After exploring the nature of Rawls’s commitment to the opportunity for meaningful work, I ask why he thinks it is a social basis of self-respect. I extract a partial answer from his writings, then speculate about his full reasoning. Finally, I consider whether Rawls is right that the opportunity for meaningful work is a social basis of self-respect. I give some reason to believe that he is.

“Ross on Desert and Punishment,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87:2 (2006), pp. 231 - 244.
W.D. Ross thinks it is good, other things equal, that people get what they deserve.  But he denies that “the principle of punishing the vicious, for the sake of doing so, is that on which the state should proceed in its bestowal of punishments.”  Ross offers two main arguments for this denial: what I call the “scope argument” and the “state’s purpose argument.”  I argue that both fail.  In doing so, I illuminate Ross’s distinctive views about desert and the state.

“The Epistemological Argument Against Desert,” Utilitas 17:2 (2005), pp. 205 - 221.
Most contemporary political philosophers deny that justice requires giving people what they deserve.  According to a familiar anti-desert argument, the influence of genes and environment on people’s actions and traits undermines all desert-claims.  According to a less familiar -- but more plausible -- argument, the influence of genes and environment on people’s actions and traits undermines some desert-claims (or all desert-claims to an extent).  But, it says, we do not know which ones (or to what extent). This paper examines this ‘epistemological’ argument against desert.  After considering some preliminary problems with it, I give reason to believe it fails.  I emphasize the importance of justice relative to efficiency and attempt to construct a practical way of measuring desert.

“Against the Asymmetry of Desert,” Noûs 37:3 (September 2003), pp. 518 - 536.
The concept of desert has traditionally played a central role in theories of both distributive and retributive justice.  But while desert continues to play a central role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice, it plays little or no role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice.  This asymmetric treatment of desert is prima facie strange.  If people should have the punishment they deserve, shouldn’t they also have the social benefits they deserve?  I first offer an intuitive argument against the asymmetry, then consider and reject four potential justifications of it.  My conclusion is that we should be highly skeptical of the asymmetry.  This, in turn, should lead us to re-examine contemporary views about both distributive and retributive justice.

“Desert and Distributive Justice in A Theory of Justice,” Journal of Social Philosophy 33:1 (Spring 2002), pp. 131 - 143.
It is clear that John Rawls rejects desert as a criterion for just distribution. It is less clear why he does so. This paper argues that the standard account of Rawls's rejection of desert is flawed. He doesn't believe that, due to the influence of genes and environment on people's behavior, no one deserves anything. Rather, he believes that, due to the influence of these factors, we cannot tell what people deserve. The paper shows how criticisms of Rawls that do not appreciate the epistemological nature of his argument fail. It concludes with a new criticism of Rawls's argument, based on its proper interpretation.