Abstract

A staggering amount of work in the philosophies of apparently necessary, a priori domains like mathematics, logic, ethics and philosophy itself concerns the so-called Benacerraf-Field Challenge and its relatives: For us to know, our beliefs must correspond to the truth. Yet in certain domains, such correspondence can seem troublingly mysterious. It calls out for explanation; yet none seems available, even in principle. If it is indeed impossible to explain belief-truth correspondence in these domains, perhaps this should undermine those beliefs. Many find this line of thought intuitive. But for the past four decades, there has been a general worry about its legitimacy lurking in the background: David Lewis apparently suggested that in domains of necessary truth, our belief-forming methods are infallible because they trivially meet certain modal conditions on knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the intuitive underpinnings of both the Challenge and the relevant modal conditions expose the failings of this “Lewisian” line of argument and set the stage for more careful development of the Challenge itself.